Karpeles Arrested, Not For Missing Millions » Brave New Coin

How To End The Cryptocurrency Exchange "Wild West" Without Crippling Innovation


In case you haven't noticed the consultation paper, staff notice, and report on Quadriga, regulators are now clamping down on Canadian cryptocurrency exchanges. The OSC and other regulatory bodies are still interested in industry feedback. They have not put forward any official regulation yet. Below are some ideas/insights and a proposed framework.



Many of you have limited time to read the full proposal, so here are the highlights:

Offline Multi-Signature

Effective standards to prevent both internal and external theft. Exchange operators are trained and certified, and have a legal responsibility to users.

Regular Transparent Audits

Provides visibility to Canadians that their funds are fully backed on the exchange, while protecting privacy and sensitive platform information.

Insurance Requirements

Establishment of basic insurance standards/strategy, to expand over time. Removing risk to exchange users of any hot wallet theft.


Background and Justifications


Cold Storage Custody/Management
After reviewing close to 100 cases, all thefts tend to break down into more or less the same set of problems:
• Funds stored online or in a smart contract,
• Access controlled by one person or one system,
• 51% attacks (rare),
• Funds sent to the wrong address (also rare), or
• Some combination of the above.
For the first two cases, practical solutions exist and are widely implemented on exchanges already. Offline multi-signature solutions are already industry standard. No cases studied found an external theft or exit scam involving an offline multi-signature wallet implementation. Security can be further improved through minimum numbers of signatories, background checks, providing autonomy and legal protections to each signatory, establishing best practices, and a training/certification program.
The last two transaction risks occur more rarely, and have never resulted in a loss affecting the actual users of the exchange. In all cases to date where operators made the mistake, they've been fully covered by the exchange platforms.
• 51% attacks generally only occur on blockchains with less security. The most prominent cases have been Bitcoin Gold and Ethereum Classic. The simple solution is to enforce deposit limits and block delays such that a 51% attack is not cost-effective.
• The risk of transactions to incorrect addresses can be eliminated by a simple test transaction policy on large transactions. By sending a small amount of funds prior to any large withdrawals/transfers as a standard practice, the accuracy of the wallet address can be validated.
The proposal covers all loss cases and goes beyond, while avoiding significant additional costs, risks, and limitations which may be associated with other frameworks like SOC II.

On The Subject of Third Party Custodians
Many Canadian platforms are currently experimenting with third party custody. From the standpoint of the exchange operator, they can liberate themselves from some responsibility of custody, passing that off to someone else. For regulators, it puts crypto in similar categorization to oil, gold, and other commodities, with some common standards. Platform users would likely feel greater confidence if the custodian was a brand they recognized. If the custodian was knowledgeable and had a decent team that employed multi-sig, they could keep assets safe from internal theft. With the right protections in place, this could be a great solution for many exchanges, particularly those that lack the relevant experience or human resources for their own custody systems.
However, this system is vulnerable to anyone able to impersonate the exchange operators. You may have a situation where different employees who don't know each other that well are interacting between different companies (both the custodian and all their customers which presumably isn't just one exchange). A case study of what can go wrong in this type of environment might be Bitpay, where the CEO was tricked out of 5000 bitcoins over 3 separate payments by a series of emails sent legitimately from a breached computer of another company CEO. It's also still vulnerable to the platform being compromised, as in the really large $70M Bitfinex hack, where the third party Bitgo held one key in a multi-sig wallet. The hacker simply authorized the withdrawal using the same credentials as Bitfinex (requesting Bitgo to sign multiple withdrawal transactions). This succeeded even with the use of multi-sig and two heavily security-focused companies, due to the lack of human oversight (basically, hot wallet). Of course, you can learn from these cases and improve the security, but so can hackers improve their deception and at the end of the day, both of these would have been stopped by the much simpler solution of a qualified team who knew each other and employed multi-sig with properly protected keys. It's pretty hard to beat a human being who knows the business and the typical customer behaviour (or even knows their customers personally) at spotting fraud, and the proposed multi-sig means any hacker has to get through the scrutiny of 3 (or more) separate people, all of whom would have proper training including historical case studies.
There are strong arguments both for and against using use of third party custodians. The proposal sets mandatory minimum custody standards would apply regardless if the cold wallet signatories are exchange operators, independent custodians, or a mix of both.

On The Subject Of Insurance
ShakePay has taken the first steps into this new realm (congratulations). There is no question that crypto users could be better protected by the right insurance policies, and it certainly feels better to transact with insured platforms. The steps required to obtain insurance generally place attention in valuable security areas, and in this case included a review from CipherTrace. One of the key solutions in traditional finance comes from insurance from entities such as the CDIC.
However, historically, there wasn't found any actual insurance payout to any cryptocurrency exchange, and there are notable cases where insurance has not paid. With Bitpay, for example, the insurance agent refused because the issue happened to the third party CEO's computer instead of anything to do with Bitpay itself. With the Youbit exchange in South Korea, their insurance claim was denied, and the exchange ultimately ended up instead going bankrupt with all user's funds lost. To quote Matt Johnson in the original Lloyd's article: “You can create an insurance policy that protects no one – you know there are so many caveats to the policy that it’s not super protective.”
ShakePay's insurance was only reported to cover their cold storage, and “physical theft of the media where the private keys are held”. Physical theft has never, in the history of cryptocurrency exchange cases reviewed, been reported as the cause of loss. From the limited information of the article, ShakePay made it clear their funds are in the hands of a single US custodian, and at least part of their security strategy is to "decline[] to confirm the custodian’s name on the record". While this prevents scrutiny of the custodian, it's pretty silly to speculate that a reasonably competent hacking group couldn't determine who the custodian is. A far more common infiltration strategy historically would be social engineering, which has succeeded repeatedly. A hacker could trick their way into ShakePay's systems and request a fraudulent withdrawal, impersonate ShakePay and request the custodian to move funds, or socially engineer their way into the custodian to initiate the withdrawal of multiple accounts (a payout much larger than ShakePay) exploiting the standard procedures (for example, fraudulently initiating or override the wallet addresses of a real transfer). In each case, nothing was physically stolen and the loss is therefore not covered by insurance.
In order for any insurance to be effective, clear policies have to be established about what needs to be covered. Anything short of that gives Canadians false confidence that they are protected when they aren't in any meaningful way. At this time, the third party insurance market does not appear to provide adequate options or coverage, and effort is necessary to standardize custody standards, which is a likely first step in ultimately setting up an insurance framework.
A better solution compared to third party insurance providers might be for Canadian exchange operators to create their own collective insurance fund, or a specific federal organization similar to the CDIC. Such an organization would have a greater interest or obligation in paying out actual cases, and that would be it's purpose rather than maximizing it's own profit. This would be similar to the SAFU which Binance has launched, except it would cover multiple exchanges. There is little question whether the SAFU would pay out given a breach of Binance, and a similar argument could be made for a insurance fund managed by a collective of exchange operators or a government organization. While a third party insurance provider has the strong market incentive to provide the absolute minimum coverage and no market incentive to payout, an entity managed by exchange operators would have incentive to protect the reputation of exchange operators/the industry, and the government should have the interest of protecting Canadians.

On The Subject of Fractional Reserve
There is a long history of fractional reserve failures, from the first banks in ancient times, through the great depression (where hundreds of fractional reserve banks failed), right through to the 2008 banking collapse referenced in the first bitcoin block. The fractional reserve system allows banks to multiply the money supply far beyond the actual cash (or other assets) in existence, backed only by a system of debt obligations of others. Safely supporting a fractional reserve system is a topic of far greater complexity than can be addressed by a simple policy, and when it comes to cryptocurrency, there is presently no entity reasonably able to bail anyone out in the event of failure. Therefore, this framework is addressed around entities that aim to maintain 100% backing of funds.
There may be some firms that desire but have failed to maintain 100% backing. In this case, there are multiple solutions, including outside investment, merging with other exchanges, or enforcing a gradual restoration plan. All of these solutions are typically far better than shutting down the exchange, and there are multiple cases where they've been used successfully in the past.

Proof of Reserves/Transparency/Accountability
Canadians need to have visibility into the backing on an ongoing basis.
The best solution for crypto-assets is a Proof of Reserve. Such ideas go back all the way to 2013, before even Mt. Gox. However, no Canadian exchange has yet implemented such a system, and only a few international exchanges (CoinFloor in the UK being an example) have. Many firms like Kraken, BitBuy, and now ShakePay use the Proof of Reserve term to refer to lesser proofs which do not actually cryptographically prove the full backing of all user assets on the blockchain. In order for a Proof of Reserve to be effective, it must actually be a complete proof, and it needs to be understood by the public that is expected to use it. Many firms have expressed reservations about the level of transparency required in a complete Proof of Reserve (for example Kraken here). While a complete Proof of Reserves should be encouraged, and there are some solutions in the works (ie TxQuick), this is unlikely to be suitable universally for all exchange operators and users.
Given the limitations, and that firms also manage fiat assets, a more traditional audit process makes more sense. Some Canadian exchanges (CoinSquare, CoinBerry) have already subjected themselves to annual audits. However, these results are not presently shared publicly, and there is no guarantee over the process including all user assets or the integrity and independence of the auditor. The auditor has been typically not known, and in some cases, the identity of the auditor is protected by a NDA. Only in one case (BitBuy) was an actual report generated and publicly shared. There has been no attempt made to validate that user accounts provided during these audits have been complete or accurate. A fraudulent fractional exchange, or one which had suffered a breach they were unwilling to publicly accept (see CoinBene), could easily maintain a second set of books for auditors or simply exclude key accounts to pass an individual audit.
The proposed solution would see a reporting standard which includes at a minimum - percentage of backing for each asset relative to account balances and the nature of how those assets are stored, with ownership proven by the auditor. The auditor would also publicly provide a "hash list", which they independently generate from the accounts provided by the exchange. Every exchange user can then check their information against this public "hash list". A hash is a one-way form of encryption, which fully protects the private information, yet allows anyone who knows that information already to validate that it was included. Less experienced users can take advantage of public tools to calculate the hash from their information (provided by the exchange), and thus have certainty that the auditor received their full balance information. Easy instructions can be provided.
Auditors should be impartial, their identities and process public, and they should be rotated so that the same auditor is never used twice in a row. Balancing the cost of auditing against the needs for regular updates, a 6 month cycle likely makes the most sense.

Hot Wallet Management
The best solution for hot wallets is not to use them. CoinBerry reportedly uses multi-sig on all withdrawals, and Bitmex is an international example known for their structure devoid of hot wallets.
However, many platforms and customers desire fast withdrawal processes, and human validation has a cost of time and delay in this process.
A model of self-insurance or separate funds for hot wallets may be used in these cases. Under this model, a platform still has 100% of their client balance in cold storage and holds additional funds in hot wallets for quick withdrawal. Thus, the risk of those hot wallets is 100% on exchange operators and not affecting the exchange users. Since most platforms typically only have 1%-5% in hot wallets at any given time, it shouldn't be unreasonable to build/maintain these additional reserves over time using exchange fees or additional investment. Larger withdrawals would still be handled at regular intervals from the cold storage.
Hot wallet risks have historically posed a large risk and there is no established standard to guarantee secure hot wallets. When the government of South Korea dispatched security inspections to multiple exchanges, the results were still that 3 of them got hacked after the inspections. If standards develop such that an organization in the market is willing to insure the hot wallets, this could provide an acceptable alternative. Another option may be for multiple exchange operators to pool funds aside for a hot wallet insurance fund. Comprehensive coverage standards must be established and maintained for all hot wallet balances to make sure Canadians are adequately protected.

Current Draft Proposal

(1) Proper multi-signature cold wallet storage.
(a) Each private key is the personal and legal responsibility of one person - the “signatory”. Signatories have special rights and responsibilities to protect user assets. Signatories are trained and certified through a course covering (1) past hacking and fraud cases, (2) proper and secure key generation, and (3) proper safekeeping of private keys. All private keys must be generated and stored 100% offline by the signatory. If even one private keys is ever breached or suspected to be breached, the wallet must be regenerated and all funds relocated to a new wallet.
(b) All signatories must be separate background-checked individuals free of past criminal conviction. Canadians should have a right to know who holds their funds. All signing of transactions must take place with all signatories on Canadian soil or on the soil of a country with a solid legal system which agrees to uphold and support these rules (from an established white-list of countries which expands over time).
(c) 3-5 independent signatures are required for any withdrawal. There must be 1-3 spare signatories, and a maximum of 7 total signatories. The following are all valid combinations: 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7.
(d) A security audit should be conducted to validate the cold wallet is set up correctly and provide any additional pertinent information. The primary purpose is to ensure that all signatories are acting independently and using best practices for private key storage. A report summarizing all steps taken and who did the audit will be made public. Canadians must be able to validate the right measures are in place to protect their funds.
(e) There is a simple approval process if signatories wish to visit any country outside Canada, with a potential whitelist of exempt countries. At most 2 signatories can be outside of aligned jurisdiction at any given time. All exchanges would be required to keep a compliant cold wallet for Canadian funds and have a Canadian office if they wish to serve Canadian customers.
(2) Regular and transparent solvency audits.
(a) An audit must be conducted at founding, after 3 months of operation, and at least once every 6 months to compare customer balances against all stored cryptocurrency and fiat balances. The auditor must be known, independent, and never the same twice in a row.
(b) An audit report will be published featuring the steps conducted in a readable format. This should be made available to all Canadians on the exchange website and on a government website. The report must include what percentage of each customer asset is backed on the exchange, and how those funds are stored.
(c) The auditor will independently produce a hash of each customer's identifying information and balance as they perform the audit. This will be made publicly available on the exchange and government website, along with simplified instructions that each customer can use to verify that their balance was included in the audit process.
(d) The audit needs to include a proof of ownership for any cryptocurrency wallets included. A satoshi test (spending a small amount) or partially signed transaction both qualify.
(e) Any platform without 100% reserves should be assessed on a regular basis by a government or industry watchdog. This entity should work to prevent any further drop, support any private investor to come in, or facilitate a merger so that 100% backing can be obtained as soon as possible.
(3) Protections for hot wallets and transactions.
(a) A standardized list of approved coins and procedures will be established to constitute valid cold storage wallets. Where a multi-sig process is not natively available, efforts will be undertaken to establish a suitable and stable smart contract standard. This list will be expanded and improved over time. Coins and procedures not on the list are considered hot wallets.
(b) Hot wallets can be backed by additional funds in cold storage or an acceptable third-party insurance provider with a comprehensive coverage policy.
(c) Exchanges are required to cover the full balance of all user funds as denominated in the same currency, or double the balance as denominated in bitcoin or CAD using an established trading rate. If the balance is ever insufficient due to market movements, the firm must rectify this within 24 hours by moving assets to cold storage or increasing insurance coverage.
(d) Any large transactions (above a set threshold) from cold storage to any new wallet addresses (not previously transacted with) must be tested with a smaller transaction first. Deposits of cryptocurrency must be limited to prevent economic 51% attacks. Any issues are to be covered by the exchange.
(e) Exchange platforms must provide suitable authentication for users, including making available approved forms of two-factor authentication. SMS-based authentication is not to be supported. Withdrawals must be blocked for 48 hours in the event of any account password change. Disputes on the negligence of exchanges should be governed by case law.

Steps Forward

Continued review of existing OSC feedback is still underway. More feedback and opinions on the framework and ideas as presented here are extremely valuable. The above is a draft and not finalized.
The process of further developing and bringing a suitable framework to protect Canadians will require the support of exchange operators, legal experts, and many others in the community. The costs of not doing such are tremendous. A large and convoluted framework, one based on flawed ideas or implementation, or one which fails to properly safeguard Canadians is not just extremely expensive and risky for all Canadians, severely limiting to the credibility and reputation of the industry, but an existential risk to many exchanges.
The responsibility falls to all of us to provide our insight and make our opinions heard on this critical matter. Please take the time to give your thoughts.
submitted by azoundria2 to QuadrigaInitiative [link] [comments]

A Brief History of People Losing their Cryptocurrency

A Brief History of People Losing their Cryptocurrency
The history of cryptocurrency is fraught with people losing their coins, whether through carelessness, greed, bad luck, or some combination of the above. Some ignored the first rule of crypto: “never leave your crypto on an exchange.” When their exchange failed, their crypto went with it. Others were negligent with their storage solutions, misplacing old hard drives, using software wallets on malware-ridden PCs, forgetting the passwords to hardware wallets. Some were greedy and lost their coins to a Nigerian Crypto Prince or a Ponzi scheme. And some were just plain unlucky. These unfortunate tales remind us to be careful with our crypto, and underscore the need for new solutions to storing crypto safely.
Buying cryptocurrency used to be a risky prospect. There weren’t many exchanges, they often required you to deposit fiat via a third party, you certainly couldn’t use your credit card, and there was hardly any regulation. It was considered unwise to leave your cryptocurrency on the exchange after you bought it. Many people today feel safe buying some crypto on Coinbase or Binance, without transferring it to a personal wallet, but in those wild years you absolutely wanted control of your private keys. If the exchange had the keys, you were trusting your crypto to the reputation of a small company, located who-knows-where, that made its revenue by exchanging speculative, unregulated digital currencies between anonymous traders. One such company was Mt. Gox.
Mt Gox was a Tokyo based Bitcoin exchange. Led by CEO Mark Karpelès, who was also majority shareholder and lead developer, Mt Gox expanded quickly. Founded in 2010 and bought by Karpelès in 2011, Mt. Gox quickly dominated the Bitcoin market, responsible for 70% of BTC volume in 2013, with 1.1 million active accounts. But despite the outwards success, there were some signs that all was not well internally. Karpelès refused to allow any updates to the exchange software, without approving changes to the source code, meaning needed updates could languish for weeks. In June, 2011 the exchange lost $8.75 million in Bitcoin to a cyberattack, and the site went offline. According to friends of Karpelès who flew in to help get Mt. Gox back online, Karpelès seemed surprisingly relaxed about the affair, even taking the weekend off.
Mt. Gox was brought back online, but soon after US Federal agents seized $5 million from the company’s US account, and former business partner CoinLab sued for $75 million. Karpelès seemed more focused on creating a Bitcoin Cafe in the Mt. Gox building than on addressing these many issues. After an internal memo was leaked disclosing the disappearance of 850,000 BTC (worth about $460 million at the time), Mt. Gox collapsed into bankruptcy. It is still in bankruptcy proceedings today.
https://preview.redd.it/ycurk9dlnj611.jpg?width=800&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=7b8199c3dc1e58536f9813918b46cca43a4edec4
One might be tempted to dismiss the failure of Mt. Gox as a lesson learned by the crypto community, a mistake that wouldn’t be repeated. Sadly, exchanges continue to lose their customers’ crypto with startling regularity. A less spectacular but much more recent loss was $150 million of Nano stolen from exchange Bitgrail in February. Bitgrail’s management blamed the Nano blockchain software for the theft, but has refused to release any evidence. Nano, for its part, has vigorously defended itself against Bitgrail’s claims, showing that the missing Nano was stored in a hot wallet (one that is accessible online) instead of a cold wallet, which would have been more protected. Whoever’s to blame, if you had Nano on Bitgrail, it’s gone. Similarly, if you had any crypto on Korean exchange Youbit, you’re down 17%, which was stolen in a hack in December. Or if you used Bitconnect, you’ll find your Bitconnect tokens became nearly worthless after the company shuttered in January.
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“Dozens of exchanges have failed since the creation of Bitcoin, taking many small fortunes with them. This should serve as a reminder to never leave your cryptocurrency on an exchange; however there are other ways to lose your coins,” according to Saifu co-founder Evgeny Vigovsky.
In October of 2017, a new cryptocurrency was created called Bitcoin Gold. Bitcoin Gold is a fork of the Bitcoin blockchain. This meant that anyone who owned Bitcoin was now entitled to an equivalent amount of Bitcoin Gold. Many were eager to claim their share, and some found a Bitcoin Gold online wallet called mybtgwallet.com. This helpful site offered to assist users claim their Bitcoin Gold, instructing them to enter their wallet’s seed or private key. The seed is a series of words, usually 24, that can be used to recreate a wallet if it’s lost or corrupted. Giving someone your wallet seed or private keys is akin to giving them the keys to your safe deposit box, and the victims of mybtgwallet found their wallets were quickly emptied of whatever cryptocurrencies they held. More than $3 million in Bitcoin was stolen.
https://preview.redd.it/e5btpnfunj611.png?width=800&format=png&auto=webp&s=e2fa9a011de23e4f223d815567b061e3d2bc7625
MyEtherWallet is a popular online wallet for Ethereum and other tokens built on the Ethereum blockchain. The wallet is free to use, and as far as online wallets go, it’s secure, requiring users to take steps to protect themselves. In December, the MyEtherWallet iOS app hit the #3 spot on the App Store in the finance category. Unfortunately for the thousands of users who bought the app for $4.99, this app was just another scam. MyEtherWallet doesn’t have an app (and Apple doesn’t allow wallet apps on the App Store). Suspicious users alerted the MyEtherWallet team, who alerted Apple. Two days later, Apple responded and removed the app from the app store.
https://preview.redd.it/jcokfj6ynj611.png?width=519&format=png&auto=webp&s=903ea36e5e749a1854ae8fcacabc19032276ed04
Less colorful but more insidious, there are a plethora of malware that targets cryptocurrency wallets. These programs run quietly in the background, searching for wallet software on your computer and uploading your credentials. A particularly nasty bit of malware was the Pony botnet, discovered in September 2014. The Pony botnet used a trojan virus to compromise about 700,000 accounts, including email accounts, website login credentials, and other sensitive information. Bitcoin totalling 335 were stolen from 85 different wallets; those Bitcoin are worth about $2.7 million today.
Some classic scams have been updated for cryptocurrencies, including a variation on the Nigerian prince con, harnessing social media to attract victims. In the classic Nigerian prince scam, the victim would receive an email from a Nigerian prince who needs help to move his wealth to the United States. The prince needs someone to deposit a check for him, then wire out the funds. They pay the wire fee but get to keep part of the funds from the deposited check. Typically the victim’s bank informs them that they’ve deposited a bad check well after they’ve wired out the funds for the “Prince.”
In the new variation, scammers impersonate well-known figures of the tech world like Elon Musk or John McAfee, often on Twitter. They use a name similar to the celebrity, and their picture. They claim to be giving away cryptocurrency to the first 100 people to respond to the tweet, but there’s a catch; respondents need to send a small amount of crypto to pay for the “fees.” Naturally, the scammer just keeps these small bits of crypto and does not send anything in return. Here’s “Elon Msk” giving away some free Bitcoin:
https://preview.redd.it/jwasx3v3oj611.png?width=622&format=png&auto=webp&s=d1a9da3a2cc9859527e3b7939c61c61428a71a85
Thankfully, crypto security is steadily improving. The rise in value and mainstream adoption have attracted established cybersecurity players, and innovative new storage solutions are being created with increasing frequency. Our firm Saifu has developed its own crypto storage hardware in partnership with Thales. “Users’ crypto keys are stored in Thales hardware security modules, which cannot be accessed remotely. Even if we were ever hacked, our customers’ cryptocurrencies are protected. As it becomes safer and easier to buy and use cryptocurrencies, we believe mainstream adoption will skyrocket. The crypto revolution is just beginning,” Vigovsky, the Saifu co-founder, says.
submitted by Saifu-Lola to saifu [link] [comments]

Garrison's NCLEX Tutoring - YouTube News : Binance Blockchain ,Mt Gox Dump, OkCoin China Govt ... Top 5 Signs of the Bottom for Crypto

The MT Gox thief? Unconfirmed bitcoin addresses of BTC-e are starting to circulate. The exchange apparently had some 560,000 bitcoins, currently worth $1.4 billion, with 66,000 bitcoins already suspected of being on the move as we reported earlier, but there seems to be another 66,000 that has gone.. It remains unclear who is moving the funds or who controls the rest with more details expected ... Federal agent accused of bitcoin theft in Silk Road bust confesses By Brian Booker Last updated on January 2, 2018 at 00:00 4 Comments The Silk Road bust was one of the biggest crime busts of all time. Mt Gox Claimants May See Distribution Soon. At the end of 2013, digital currency proponents knew something was fishy with the crypto trading platform Mt Gox. The bitcoin community later found out that the exchange was hacked and 850,000 BTC was stolen. Later, Mt Gox CEO Mark Karpeles found 200,000 BTC ($1.3 billion using current exchange rates ... where did mt gox bitcoins go - It is after the ownership transfer that the new owner noted that Mt Gox lost 80,000 BTC through a hack in the past. By then, the bitcoin was worth roughly 60,000 U.S dollars. As the price of bitcoin went on appreciating, the value of the lost bitcoins started worrying Mt Gox investors. - Mt. Gox remains under bankruptcy protection, with the case still being under ... 1. February 2014. Mt.Gox 850,ooo BTC. The greatest theft in the cryptocurrency world. $425 million then, and, as crazy as it sounds, USD 6.3 billion now. The platform that hosted 80% of Bitcoin trades at that time was destroyed. After the conducted research it became clear that security issues have existed at least since 2011, which allowed ... Bitcoin Mt Gox Arrest. The MtGox exchange collapse was a milestone moment in the Bitcoin industry, and won’t be forgotten. The international investigation has shown ties to the Silk Road ... According to a federal indictment announced by Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, Russian agents used bitcoin in their campaign to influence the outcome of the 2016 US elections. Authorities in Washington claim that hackers working for the Russian foreign military intelligence paid in crypto for servers in the US and Malaysia, website domains, and virtual private networks (VPNs) used to ... In July 2017 they went on holiday to Greece, unaware US federal agents investigating international money laundering were on their trail. The FBI suspected BTC-e was involved in hiding funds stolen from the hack of another bitcoin exchange, Mt Gox. Cybercrime experts also thought it was being used by the mysterious Russian hacking group Fancy Bears.

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Garrison's NCLEX Tutoring - YouTube

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